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MODERN WAR AND THE VALIDITY OF TREATIESt
Richard Rank*
Judicial Decisions
1) The United States. As a result of the Second World War, many
cases have arisen in the United States in which the effect of war on
treaties has been an issue. The leading recent case is Clark v. Allen,'53
decided in 1947. This article will deal with this and subsequent de-
cisions.'54
The Clark case involved the effect of war on the Treaty of December
8, 1923 between the United States and Germany, 55 which granted
certain reciprocal inheritance rights to American and German nationals
as to property situated in the other's country. Alvina Wagner, a Cali-
fornia resident, died in 1942 leaving a will bequeathing her real and
personal property -to relatives who were residents and nationals of
Germany. American heirs-at-law of the decedent claimed the estate,
urging that the 1923 treaty had been rendered inoperative by the war,
and that the German legatees were ineligible under the California
statute,'16 which permits non-resident aliens to inherit only if a re-
ciprocal right is given to Americans.
In 1943 the Alien Property Custodian, pursuant to the Trading with
the Enemy Act, 5 7 vested in himself for the use of the United States, all
interest of the German legatees in the estate, and filed suit against the
executor of the will and the American heirs-at-law for judgment declar-
ing ownership of the estate in him.
The district court rendered judgment in favor of the Custodian.'
t This is the second of two installments. The first appeared in the Spring, 1953, issue of
the QUARTmY.
* See Contributors' section, Masthead, p. 541, for biographical data.
10 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Notes, 47 CoL. L. Rnv. 318 (1947); 7 LAW. GUILD REV. 270
(1947); 32 Mixe. L. Rav. 407 (1948); 23 NOTRE DAm LAW. 266 (1948); 21 So. CAxW.
L. REv. 106 (1947).
154 For the period before the Clark case see Lenoir, The Effect of War on Bihsteral
Treaties, 34 GEo. L. J. 129, 151 (1946).
155 44 STAT. 2133, 2135, Art. IV (1923).
156 CAL. PROB. CoDn AwNr. §§ 259-592 (Deering 1944), as amended, by CAL. STAT. 1945
c. 1160 §§ 1-3.
157 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U.S.C.Arp. § 1, et seq. (1948), as amended, by the First
War Powers Act of 1941, 55 STAT. 839 (1941) 50 U.S.C.App. § 616 (Supp. 1946).
158 Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1943) holding the California statute
unconstitutional, as improper state regulation of foreign affairs.
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The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 159 holding that the 1923
treaty had been abrogated by the war and by the provisions of the
Trading with the Enemy Act so that the German legatees had no interest
that the Alien Property Custodian could seize. The court noted that
similar inheritance provisions in the 1828 treaty with Prussia had been
considered abrogated after World War I.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and
held that Article IV of the Treaty of 1923 was still in force. The
Court declared that it started from the premise that the outbreak of
war does not necessarily suspend or abrogate treaty provisions. It
also remarked that there was no reliable evidence of the intention of
the parties outside the words of the treaty. From this we may perhaps
infer that it would consider the intention of the parties at the time of
concluding the treaty controlling, were it ascertainable. In the ab-
sence of any indication of an intention that the treaty was to become
inoperative in whole or in part on the outbreak of war, the Court
used the test of compatibility with national policy 60 to determine the
validity of the treaty.
The Court lists three standards of compatibility which are worth
examining in detail. First, "there may of course be such an incompat-
ibility between a particular treaty provision and the maintenance of
a state of war as to make it clear that it should not be enforced." Kar-
nuth v. United States 6 ' is cited as the authority for this standard. The
standard of incompatibility due to the very nature of a treaty provision
is a valid one in so far as it attempts to take into account the intention
of the parties, as, e.g., in purely political treaties. It seems, however,
that the provision in the Karnuth case was not of this type. The
Karnuth case is unique among Supreme Court decisions in its holding
that war abrogates treaty provisions of certain types 6 2 and in it the
Court was actually trying to give effect to a subsequent immigration
159 Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1946).
160 Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243, 128 N.E. 185, 192 (1920): "Their [the court's]
part it is . . . to determine whether . . . the provision [of a treaty] is inconsistent with
the policy or safety of the nation in the emergency of war, and hence presumably intended
to be limited to times of peace. I find nothing incompatible with the policy of the
government, with the safety of the nation, or with the maintenance of the war in the
enforcement of this treaty. . . . It follows that, even in its application to aliens in
hostile territory, the maintenance of this treaty is in harmony with the nation's policy
and consistent with the nation's welfare." (Italics supplied.)
161 279 U.S. 231 (1928).
162 The identical provisions of the Jay Treaty, Art. 3 was held not abrogated by the
War of 1812 in so far as it permitted free passage of American Indians over the Canadian
border. United States ex fel. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F.Supp. 660 (1947).
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statute, without calling it inconsistent with the treaty. It is submitted
that except in construing the intention of the parties the court should
not look at the treaty provision on its face in relation to the state of
war to see whether it is compatible with national policy, since national
policy with respect to the conduct of a war is determined by the execu-
tive and legislative departments. The Court does not in fact apply
this standard in the Clark case.
Second, national policy as formulated by the legislature is used as
a test of compatibility. The Court in the Clark case examined the
Trading with the Enemy Act and found that the provisions of the
treaty dealing with the inheritance of real property163 were entirely
compatible with the Act. This was not true of the parts of Article IV
dealing with liquidation of an inheritance and withdrawal of the pro-
ceeds, which the Court indicated it would consider abrogated because
they were incompatible with national policy as expressed in the pro-
visions of the Act prohibiting removal of money or property from
the country for the use of German nationals. The Court, however, found
no such hostility to ownership of property by enemy aliens in the terms
of the Act. It rejected the contention that the power to vest alien
property in an agency of the United States revealed such hostility on
the grounds firstly, that the power to vest was discretionary, and secondly,
because the power was not restricted to the property of alien enemies.
It pointed out that there were many similar clauses in treaties with
friendly nations, and said that it would not assume that Congress in-
tended to abrogate these. The Court said, "if the power to vest is in-
consistent with the right of inheritance of an alien enemy, it is difficult
to see why it is any less so when other aliens are involved."' 64
Third, the Court examines the views of the executive department,
referring to a letter from the State Department to the Attorney General6 5
supporting the legal view that the treaty of 1923 is not abrogated. The
Court does not say what weight it gave to the views of the State Depart-
ment, although the result conformed with the State Department's view.
In looking to the actions and views of the legislative and executive
163 Although the realty provisions were held to cover the disposition and inheritance of
real property by any national of either party to the treaty without regard to the
nationality of the decedent, the Court held that the personalty provisions did not provide
for inheritance by alien of the personal property of a deceased American citizen. For a
criticism of this distinction, see Meekinson, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of
Personal Property. 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 313 (1950).
164 See 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947).
165 The letter, dated May 21, 1945, is printed in 30 U.S. Supreme Court, Briefs, pp. 24-
31; 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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branches of the Government to determine compatibility with national
policy, the Court used the present intention of the Government in
deciding the validity of the treaty provision. This is to be contrasted
with an attempt to find the intention of both parties at the time of
conclusion of the treaty, which is the usual and correct method, and
the method employed by the lower court, although that court reached
the wrong result. The Supreme Court used the present intention stand-
ard because it assumed that war, rather than the Treaty of Versailles,
had abrogated the Treaty of 1828 (a corresponding commercial treaty
to the 1923 treaty), to which the Court drew an analogy. The Court
excused itself for adopting the test of present intention on the ground
that there was no reliable evidence of the intent of the parties at the
time of conclusion of the treaty. However, it is believed that the
Court was too cursory. The very fact that it was the Treaty of Ver-
sailles which abrogated the Treaty of 1828 and not war, leads to the
inference that in the absence as yet of a similar peace treaty provision,
the 1923 Treaty is not abrogated. Moreover, it may be significant
that there were many similar treaties with various German States, and
that the State Department probably intended to achieve a certain
uniformity by renegotiation. Also, since the American view has been that
treaties are not necessarily abrogated by war, it may be reasonable to as-
sume that because of the absence of an express terminating provision in
the 1923 Treaty the intention was that it remain intact in case of
war.166 Finally in the absence of any action by the political depart-
166 The N. Y. Times of June 4, 1953, p. 1, col. 5, carries the information that on June 3,
1953, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Dr. James B. Conant, United States High Commis-
sioner, signed an agreement on reactivating the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Trade and
Consular Rights for the purpose to re-establish an interim treaty basis for economic and
consular relations between the United States and West Germany pending the completion of
negotiations for a fundamental Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. It is
further stated, that this 9eactivization of the 1923 Treaty represents the first move of the
United States and West German Governments to normalize their relations on a legal basis
independently of the Bonn "Peace Contract" with the Western Allies, which still remains
to be ratified by other Allies, although ratified by the United States and Germany.
This news-item seems to contradict, at the first glance, the holdings of the United States
courts in Clark v. Allen and other cases and with the conclusions reached at by the writer
in upholding the validity of the 1923 Treaty with Germany, although it is not quite clear
what is exactly meant by the word "reactivization". It seems however that there need not
be any contradiction if by "reactivization" is meant the application of the 1923 Treaty in
its entirety. In Clark case and in other cases, only the validity and applicability of Article IV
of the 1923 Treaty was involved and nothing was mentioned of other provisions of that
Treaty. The writer believes it reasonable to assume that the intention of the parties was
that the other provisions also remained valid and intact in case of war, although they were
not in fact applied. Now the 1923 Treaty was declared to be "reactivated" or applicable in
[Vol. 38
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ments courts assume that the legal order created by a treaty remain
valid. Although the method used by the Court in the Clark case leaves
the way open to distortion of the original intention of the parties, the
result was fortunately a sound one.
There has been no Supreme Court decision as to the validity of a
treaty provision during time of war since the Clark case. There have,
however, been state and lower federal court cases, some involving the
same treaty provision as the Clark case and some dealing with the con-
dinued validity of other treaty provisions.
In re Knutzen's Estate1 7 decedent, a resident of California, died
intestate. A brother who also resided in California, and another brother
and two sisters who were residents and nationals of Germany, survived
him. The Alien Property Custodian issued an order declaring that the
non-resident heirs were residents of Germany, an enemy country, and
purporting to vest in himself their interest in the estate. The Court,
following the precedent of the Clark case, which was decided during
the pendency of the appeal of this case, held that the Treaty of 1923
with Germany, which permitted the German nationals to inherit, was
in force and not abrogated or suspended by the outbreak of war. 68
The same treaty provision was said not to have been suspended
or abrogated in Blank v. Clark,69 although plaintiff was not permitted
to take the property as a result of a power of attorney from the German
heir. The Court held that although the treaty provision was still in
force and the German heir could consequently inherit the real property,
the transaction purporting to give plaintiff the power of attorney was
prohibited by the Trading with the Enemy Act and General Ruling
Number 1.170
The effect of war on a provision of the Treaty of 1923 giving na-
tionals of either state "freedom of access to the courts of justice of
the other" was discussed in Meier v. Schmidt'71 by the Supreme Court
its entirety. On the other hand, as we have seen already supra p. 353, n. 137 when dealing
with the views of political departments, the view of the Bonn Government was that the 1923
Treaty was not in force any more because it was a commercial and political treaty. This
also may have been an impetus to the United States Government to sign a new agreement.
167 31 Cal.2d 573, 191 P.2d 747 (1948).
168 The right of the alien heirs under the treaty to succeed to personalty turned on the
citizenship of the decedent under the holding of the Clark case, note 163 supra. The record
was silent as to this fact.
169 79 F.Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
170 8 FED. RE . 12, 287, 31 CFR 1310, App. A (Supp. 1943).
171 150 Neb. 383, 34 N.W.2d 400 (1948), rehearing denied, 150 Neb. 647, 35 N.W.2d 500
(1948).
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of Nebraska. This was a suit on a promissory note brought by a
German national in 1939. The action lay dormant until 1947 when
the defendant died. Plaintiff sought to revive the action against the
executor, who pleaded that plaintiff had no rights under the treaty since
the war had abrogated it. The Court found an incompatibility between
a provision of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and hence with Con-
gressional policy, and this treaty provision. It held that the Trading
with the Enemy Act barred a non-resident enemy alien from prosecuting
an action in the court of the state, even though instituted before hostil-
ities. However, it approved the action of the trial court in retaining
jurisdiction until the termination of the war between the United States
and Germany, saying that the treaty provisions may "be disregarded
only to the extent and for the time required by the necessities of war,
or when they conflict with policies established by the Chief Executive
or the Congress." 72
In the case In re Meyer's Estate17 3 the effect of the First World
War on the Convention of 1827 between the United States and the
Free Hanseatic Republics 74 was discussed. Bertha Meyer, a German
national, died in Germany in 1924, leaving personal property in Cali-
fornia consisting of certain shares of stock. Her heirs included American
citizens resident in California and German nationals residing in Ger-
many. During the Second World War the Alien Property Custodian
vested the shares of the German heirs as enemy property. The Ameri-
can heirs claimed that the above treaty was abrogated by the outbreak of
World War I and they were therefore entitled to all the property. The
Court held that the Treaty of 1827 entitled the German heirs to inherit
the property regardless of certain California statutes," and that this
treaty was in force and effect at the time of decedent's death in 1924, and
was not abrogated by the First World War.
The Court then discussed whether the provisions of the Treaty of
Berlin of 1921, between the United States and Germany,1 6 under
which the United States received the benefits of certain parts of the
Treaty of Versailles, including Article 289, abrogated the above Treaty
of 1827. Article 289 provided that each Allied or Associated Power
was to notify Germany of the bilateral treaties which it wished to
172 Id. at 387, citing the Techt and Clark cases.
173 107 Cal.App. 2d 799, 238 P.2d 597 (1951).
174 8 STAT. 366 (1855).
175 Sections 672 and 1404 of the Civil Code, in force at the time of the decedent's death
in 1924. The court held that these sections were suspended during the life of the Treaty.
176 42 STAT. 1939, 1942 (1921).
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revive with Germany, and that "only those bilateral treaties and
conventions which have been the subject of such a notification shall
be revived between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany.
All others are and shall remain abrogated." The United States made
no notification with respect to any of the provisions of the Treaty of
1827.11 The Court, however, interpreted Article 289 as inapplicable
to this treaty, saying:
We are of the opinion, in accord with the Supreme Court of Kansas,178
that Article 289 is to be interpreted as not applying to any treaty . . .
which was not abrogated by the war, since there was no occasion to re-
vive a treaty . . . which had been continuously in force, and that it was
not the intention by the clause "all others are and shall remain abrogated",
to absolutely wipe out all former treaties between the United States and
the German states. The language of Article 289 is equivocal and uncertain.
It is not lightly to be supposed that it was the intention to ... abrogate
a provision which was not incompatible with war... . In the absence of
express words to that effect, it is difficult to infer that it was the purpose
of the contracting parties to withdraw the privilege of individuals to
inherit, which was not incompatible with hostilities, and which the war
had not disturbed.179
The question of the interpretation of Article 289 is an important one
since many of the contemporary peace treaties embody the identical
provision.'8 0 The interpretation of the Court in the Meyer case, though
a laudable attempt to uphold the treaty, is not in my opinion sound.
The Court did not have the parties consult the political department
to aid it in construction, as was done in the Clark case. Though in-
terpretation is a matter for the courts, the views of the political de-
partment are important if effect is to be given to the intent of the
parties. This is particularly true where the interpretation involves,
as it does here, the question of whether the parties acting in a political
capacity have terminated a treaty obligation. If the parties had clearly
expressed their wish to terminate all treaty provisions in Article 289,
the court would be bound by this, as it would by any other means
which the political department would use to terminate a treaty pro-
vision. 18 The word of the political department would not be binding
177 5 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 387-390 (1943).
178 Citing State ex rel. Miner v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 Pac. 158 (1926).
179 At pp. 603-604. Italics supplied.
180 Article 44 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 61 STAT. 1386 (1947); Article 8
[Bulgaria, 61 STAT. 1956 (1947)1; Article 10 [Hungary, 61 STAT. 2115 (1947)1; Article 10
[Rumania, 61 STAT. 1803 (1947)]; Article 12 [Finland, DEPT. OF STATE PUB. 2743, European
Series 21 (1947)]; and Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1951 [U.S. CoDE
CONG. and Aamw. SERVICE, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 2730 (1951)].
181 See pt. I, Views of Political Departments, 38 CORN LL L.Q. 321, 341 et seq. (1953).
1953]
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in this case because Article 289 is ambiguous, transforming the problem
into one of construction, and hence ultimately in the province of the
judiciary. However, from the nature of what the Court is trying to ascer-
tain, the view of the political department is even more significant in this
case than usual.
The court is correct in describing the effects of the abrogative in-
terpretation as far-reaching, but contrary to the opinion of the court,
it is believed that this total abrogation is just what was intended. All
treaties not in conformity with the new order established by the peace
treaty were to be abrogated in the absence of notification; the peace
treaty itself was the vehicle of abrogation. This interpretation is
supported by the language in other parts of Article 289; paragraph
eight reads:
The above regulations apply to all bilateral treaties or conventions exist-
ing between all the Allied and Associated Powers... and Germany....
This is also the interpretation followed by the State Department.'8
Moreover, the vigorous protest by Germany 1m against the provision of
Article 289 is more easily understood in the light of this interpretation
with its extensive abrogative effects. Finally, the language of the corre-
sponding provision in the new Japanese Peace Treaty'8 4 seems to lend
some credibility to the complete abrogation interpretation. The language
seems less equivocal in calling for complete abrogation:
Each of the Allied Powers . . . will notify Japan which of its prewar
bilateral treaties . . . with Japan it wishes to continue in force or re-
182 "This Government did not give notice within the period referred to in Article 289 as
extended by paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the Treaty between the United States and Germany
of August last, of its intention to revive the Treaty of 1828 between the United States and
Prussia, and this Treaty, therefore, is not regarded by the Department as now in force".
A letter written by the Department of State, March 21, 1923, cited in Goos v. Brocks,
117 Neb. 750, 755-756, 223 N.W.13 (1929). For a similar letter written by the Department
of State on August 6, 1923, see 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST Or INTERNATIONAL LAW 388 (1943).
On May 8, 1922, Secretary of State Hughes instructed the American Ambassador to Berlin
as follows: "Of treaties made with German Empire or independent German States the
United States desires to revive only Patent Agreement [of February 23, 1909]". FOREIGN
RELATIONS, II 267 (1922). The same view was again reiterated by the Under-Secretary of
State on November 29, 1926, as follows: "This Government considered the matter and it
was not deemed advisable to give notice . . . of its intention to revive the Treaty of 1828
between the United States and Prussia. In the circumstances, the Department does not
consider that the Treaty of 1828 was effective in 1924 . . .". 40 HARv. L. R V. 752 (1927).
See also a well-written comment on Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles by Lesser,
Treaty Provisions Dealing with the Status of Pre-war Bilateral Treaties, 51 MIcir. L. REV.
573-582 (1953).
183 See THE TREATY or VERSALLES AN) AF R 565 (1947).
184 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AoinI. SERVcE, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Art. 7, 2733 (1951).
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vive.... All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so
notified shall be regarded as abrogated.
It seems plausible to attribute this to more careful draftsmanship
than to any change in policy, in the absence of other evidence. On
this basis, it is concluded that the Court's interpretation of Article 289
is incorrect; it will be interesting to see interpretations of the new
treaty provisions.
In the case In re Braier's Estate08 5 the New York Court of Appeals
assumed the continued effectiveness of the Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Consular Rights of June 24, 1925 with Hungary 86 (Article
XXI) in holding that the deposit with the Treasurer of the City of
New York under Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act did not
contravene this Treaty. The Treaty of 1925 was terminated in 1952,
but by Governmental action, 8 7 showing thus that the United States
Government felt it necessary to take steps to terminate it despite the
war with Hungary. The Treaty provisions were controlling in this
case, however, since it was assumed by the court to have been in force
when the case was decided by the surrogate.
The above decisions are all in line with the general American view
that war does not abrogate treaties. There are, however, two cases
which are exceptions to this general rule-In re Schacht'88 and Ex parte
Zenzo Arakawa.8 9
In the first case one Schacht entered the United States as a treaty
trader. In 1945 or 1946 the Immigration Department ordered his deporta-
tion not on the ground that the treaty was no longer in force but because
Schacht had entered different work. The district court upheld the Immi-
gration Department's order on the ground that "Treaties with Germany
were terminated when war began. They have not been renewed."9 0 How-
ever, the Circuit Court of Appeals' 9 ' affirmed on a different ground-
Schacht's failure to maintain his status as a treaty merchant.
186 ill N.E.2d 424 (1953). The Court said at 427, n.1:
Although the Treaty expired on July 5, 1952 . . . and is no longer in effect, we have
assumed that its provisions are here controlling, since it was in force when the case
was denied by the surrogate.
186 Treaty Series 748, 44 STAT. 2441, 2459 (1927). The Treaty became effective
October 4, 1926.
187 On July 5, 1951, the United States Government gave the notice of termination of
this Treaty to the Hungarian Government in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
Article XXV of the same Treaty. The Treaty expired according to its provisions one year
later, i.e., on July 5, 1952. See 25 DE,'T or STATE BuLL. 95 (1951), and 26 id. at 946 (1952).
188 68 F.Supp. 216 (N.D. Tex. 1946).
189 79 F.Supp. 468 (ED. Pa. 1947).
100 At p. 217.
191 Schacht v Young, 164 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1947).
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In Ex parte Zenzo Arakawa, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
of 1911 between the United States and Japan'92 was involved. Nationals
of Japan held for removal as alien enemies sought habeas corpus. One
of their arguments was that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
of 1911193 had impliedly amended the Alien Enemy Act with respect
to them, preventing their being considered "alien enemies.""' The
petition was denied. The court held that the Treaty had been abro-
gated, saying:
Treaties vary widely in character and subject matter, and what effect
war has on them depends in a large measure on their character and subject
matter. Some are unaffected by war, some merely suspended, while
others are totally abrogated. 19 5 It would seem that treaties of commerce
and navigation would fall into the second or last of the above categories,
because the carrying out of their terms would be incompatible with the
existence of a state of war.' 96 It is apparent from a provision in the treaty
that it was the intention of the United States and the other party that the
treaty was not to be perpetual, but was to continue only at the will of
either of them. As a consequence no rights become vested as a result of
the treaty. Whether the treaty had been terminated prior to the out-
break of war between the United States and Japan is not clear. However,
it is apparent that if the treaty had not been previously terminated, it
was totally abrogated, or at least suspended, when Japan struck at Pearl
Harbor.19
7
192 TREATY SERIES No. 558, 37 STAT. 1504, Arts. I et seq., XVII (1911).
193 Article I of the Treaty provided that citizens and subjects of the contracting parties
within the other's country "shall receive . . . the most constant protection and security
for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that same rights and privileges
as are or may be granted to native citizens or subjects . .
194 Section 21 of the Alien Enemy Act.
195 Citing Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1928).
196 Citing The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
197 At p. 472. Italics supplied. It seems however that District Judge Ganey erred in
saying that "whether the treaty had been terminated prior to the outbreak of war . . . is
not clear." In fact the Treaty of 1911 with Japan was not in force any more at the outbreak
of war between the United States and Japan. On July 26, 1939, the United States
Government in view of new developments between the United States and Japan and
wishing to conclude a new treaty which would better safeguard and promote American
interests, and acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII of the
same Treaty, gave a notice of termination of this treaty. See 1 DEP'T o STATE BvLL. 61
and 81 (1939). Therefore it seems that in this case it was not necessary at all to pass upon
the issue whether the Treaty with Japan of 1911 was abrogated or suspended by the war,
because the treaty expired according to its terms on January 26, 1940, i.e., six months after
the notice of termination. A new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
between the United States and Japan was signed on April 2, 1953, at Tokyo, which is not
yet ratified. Pending the entry into force of the new Treaty general economic relations
between the United States and Japan will continue to be governed by Article 12 of the
Treaty of Peace of 1951 with Japan. As to the general provisions and principles of the
new Treaty of Friendship see 28 DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 531 (1953).
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The lower court decision in the Schacht case, and the Arakawa case
are not in line with the general American rule in their holdings that
the treaties were abrogated by war. The standard in both cases is
compatibility with war, rather than with national policy, a standard
discussed and criticized in connection with the Clark case. However,
both cases involved deportation proceedings, and are similar in this
way to the Karnuth case, which involved immigration. Thus the results
in these cases are more easily explained. The other cases discussed
above all involved private rather than public law, however. It seems
safe to conclude, therefore, that the general American rule is the same
as that enunciated by Justice Washington some one hundred and thirty
years ago-that war does not automatically terminate treaties, especially
those governing private rights.
2) Prance. French Courts, before and during World War I, generally
followed the absolute abrogation doctrine, holding that all treaties, in-
cluding those of a purely private law character, were abrogated by war. 9 '
In a few cases they made exceptions and held that treaties of a private
character law were not abrogated, but only suspended.199
During and after the Second World War, the French Courts did not
consistently apply the general abrogation rule. The validity of multi-
lateral treaties was upheld by the courts.
In the case French National Railway Company v. Chavannes, °°
19s Le domain v. Meyrand, JouRNmA Du PALris II 168 (1843); Champeaux-Grammont
v. Cardon, REC uEm GENERAL DES Lois ET DES TRA1Tfs, COLLE ON NouvE.uE 3, I, 377
(1811); Featherstonhaugh v. Boffi, decided by the Court of Cassation (Chambre criminelle),
Dec. 23, 1854, SIREY I, 811 (1854); Loewengard v. Public Prosecutor and Bouvier, A~NquAL
DIGEST Case No. 221 (1919-1922). See also JAco:ET, LA GuERuR LT LEs TAIxs 87 et seq.
(1909); Annulation des traitis bilateraux ou co~lectifs par la guerre, RE uE DE DROiT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE ET DE DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL. 5 et seq. (1915-1916).
199 E.g., decisions of the Court of Cassation of July 15, 1811, SREr I, 301 (1811); and
June 9, 1825, id. I, 402 (1826); In re Zwickert, decided by the Court of Appeal of Colmar
on April 2, 1824, SnaY II, 341 (1824); Isnard-Blanc v. Pezzales, decided by the Court of
Appeal of Aix, on December 8, 1858, SIREY II, 606 (1859). On July 29, 1925, the Court of
Colmar in deciding a case between a Czechoslovak commercial company as plaintiff and a
French defendant, which turned on the question whether Article 17 of the Hague Convention
on Civil Procedure regarding dispensation from the guarantee of judicatum solvi could be
successfully invoked by the plaintiff held that "this convention, so far as concerns relation-
ships between French and Austro-Hungarian nationals, must be considered suspended by
the war and only capable of being restored to force by a formal clause of a new treaty
effective in respect of recently created relationships." Etablissement Coullerez v. Maison
Stein, Cour d'Appel de Colmar, July 29, 1925, JomuRAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 604
(1925); Socit6 des anciens dtablissements Wenger v. C.F.P.LM., RECUEIL GENERAL DES
Lois ET DES A.REus 11, 112 (1922).
20o Court of Appeal of Aix, February 9, 1943, SEmnsA JuemIQuE Part 2, 2417 (1943),
with a note by Bastid; ZErrscHRuET PRi DEN INTERNATIONALEN EISENBsmNvERKEHR, published
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liability for the loss of an international consignment of goods was in-
volved. Contrary to the provisions of the Convention of Rome on the
Transport of Goods by Rail of November 23, 1933 (a multilateral
convention 01), a French statute (July 27, 1940) purported to relieve
the French National Railway Company (S.N.C.F.) from all re-
sponsibility for loss or damage to packages which had occurred during
the summer of 1940, when the German invasion had disorganized French
internal transport. The S.N.C.F.. pleaded exemption from liability
by virtue of the above mentioned statute. The Court of Appeal of
Aix, however, applied the Rome Convention despite the .occurrence of
war and held the S.N.C.F. liable, saying:
The Convention of Rome is an international treaty which binds the
States parties to it until such times as they withdraw therefrom in the
form and after the giving of the notice provided by the Treaty itself,
and no one of the High Contracting Parties can withdraw therefrom of
its own accord.
The Court in this case did not discuss the effect of war on the Con-
vention at all and applied the Convention despite the conflicting stat-
ute, following the French legal doctrine of the acte contraire, according
to which the obligations of a treaty cease to be binding only by virtue
of a new treaty contrary to the former. °2
In another French case20 3 goods were sent on May 20, 1944, from
Rauxel in Germany to Petit-Croix in France with an international bill
of lading, according to which the goods were to be delivered on June
20, 1944, at the latest. However, they were not delivered until July
6, 1944. The consignee brought an action for damages against the
S.N.C.F., which defended itself on the ground that the occupying
German authorities had detained the goods, arguing that this was
an act of force majeure. The Commercial Court of Seine held" 4
S.N.C.F. liable applying Article 11 of the Rome Convention of 1933.
Again no reference was made to the effect of war on the Convention,
but its continued validity was treated as a matter of course.
The Hague Multilateral Convention on Civil Procedure of 1905... was
involved in Compagnie des Assurance Maritime, Agrienne et Terrestres
by the Zentralamt in Bern, 326 (1943); AmwUAL DIGEST Case 87 (1943-1945), with a note
on p. 266.
201 6 HuDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 527 (1937).
202 See CxAnyEy, LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DES TRA1T-S INTERNATIONAUX SELON LE DROIT
COTM PORASi 109 et seq. (1932).
203 Reported in 19 TRANSPORT 5631 (1947).
204 On December 6, 1946.
205 2 MARTENS, N.R.G. 3rd ser., 243 (1909).
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v. Scagni.2 1 Scagni, an Italian subject who was expelled from France
in 1939 (before France and Italy were at war), claimed an indemnity
to cover fire damage from the C.A.M.A.T. The defendant company
demanded that security of 100,000 francs be paid into court. The
court of first instance rejected this demand and applied Article 17 of
the Hague Convention, which provides that subjects of signatory states
should not be required to pay cautio judicatum solvi in the courts of
another signatory. On appeal the Court of Appeal of Ager reversed
and held that Scagni had to pay the cautio judicatum solvi. The Court
interpreted the treaty as not covering aliens expelled, because of their
subversive conduct.
All of the above cases deal with multilateral treaties and treat them
as valid. The treatment of bilateral treaties varies. Territorial and
commercial treaties are unanimously held abrogated, while decisions
on private law treaties have not been consistent.
Feldman Publishing Company and Antin (ex parte) v. Rigaud, °7 de-
cided by the Court of Appeal of Paris on March 20, 1944, deserves
special attention because it is on the border line of the effect of war and
the effect of rupture of diplomatic relations on treaties. Feldman Pub-
lishing Company was incorporated in France, but, as a subsidiary of
Bertram Feldman Publishing Co. of London, was deemed to be an
enemy company by virtue of the "control" principle. Under the Anglo-
French Convention of February 28, 1882, and the Agreements of
May 21-25, 1929, the Company claimed from its landlord a reduction
of rent on its business premises in Paris. On March 13, 1942, the Tri-
bunal of the Seine had held that the Feldman Company was not en-
titled to take advantage of the treaties on the ground that the rupture
of diplomatic relations, which had taken place on July 4, between
France (Vichy Government) and Great Britain after the Mers-el-K6bir
(Oran) incident, had put an end to treaties existing at that date between
the two States. The Company appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed,
saying:
The Convention of February 28, 1882, and the Agreements of May 21-
25, 1929, remain in force; the breach of diplomatic relations cannot
amount to a declaration of war, and France is not de jure at war with
Great Britain. The claim for reduction of rent therefore succeeds.
206 36 REVUE CRITIQU DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRaiv 294 (1947); ANNUAL DIGEST
Case No. 99 (1946).
207 GAzETTE DU PAAis May 9, 1944; DALLoz 24 (1945), with a note by Basdevant;
RZEVUE CRITIQUE DE DRoiT INTERNATIONAL 51 et seq. (1946), with a note by Batiffol;
ANNuAL DIGEST Case No. 92 (1943-1945).
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The court's implication seems to be that a declaration of war would
abrogate these treaties.
The greatest number of cases deal with the validity of the Con-
vention on Establishment between France and Italy, signed in Rome
on June 3, 1930,08 which accords to Italian citizens, resident in France,
the same treatment as French nationals in matters concerning private
rights, without any requirement of reciprocity. Especially in lower
courts, the judges were not enthusiastic about giving Italians the same
rights as Frenchmen once war had broken out, and they therefore
held that this Convention was abrogated by the outbreak of war be-
tween France and Italy.
In the case S. v. P.109 the plaintiff, S., an Italian national, applied
for an order granting him -the right to remain in premises rented from
P., a French national. S. invoked the revelant decrees of 1939-1940,
confirmed by the Law of May 26, 1943. The Court, holding that the
Law of May 26, 1943 did not apply to S., rejected the application and
said:
The treaties of peace concluded in 1919 and 1920 implicitly admitted
that the war which began in 1914 had terminated the various treaties
previously concluded between the belligerent States. This must be deemed
to be the case to-day, in a situation which is similar, despite the existence
of the armistice. S. has not established that the Armistice Convention
includes the clause providing for either reciprocity or exemption on which
he relied.
In a similar case C. v. B.1 ° an Italian tenant farmer, under notice
to quit from his French landlord C., applied for an order giving him
an extension of his lease for an additional year. The Court, rejecting
B.'s application, said that regarding the Franco-Italian relations after
the armistice, it was clear that all treaties, including the Treaty of
Establishment of 1930, had been abrogated or suspended between
France and Italy.
These two decisions appear to be in conformity with the traditional
French jurisprudence before the war of 914. But they were decisions
of inferior courts, and could not long survive. Soon the French Courts
adopted a more liberal view which lasted for five years.
In the case I. v. I.,211 an Italian tenant farmer, under notice to quit
208 JOURNAL OIFICIFL D- LA REPUBLIQUE FRANqAiSr January 30, 1935.
209 Decided by the Tribunal de Paix of Marseilles (5th Canton), on October 26, 1943,
GAZETn DU PALAIS, PROVISIONAL SUPPLEIENT 170 (1943).
210 Decided by the Tribunal civile de Toulouse, on November 18, 1943, GAZETTE DU
PAIAIS Dec. 14, 1943.
211 Decided by the Tribunal civile de Marseilles, on October 26, 1943, GAzEm lU
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from his French landlord, applied for an order to prevent his eviction,
invoking Article 2 of the Treaty of Establishment of 1930. The land-
lord objected that the Treaty had lapsed on the outbreak of war, but
the Court granted the tenant security of tenure for a year, adding:
The outbreak of war between two nations has the effect of extinguishing
or suspending the execution of treaties made between the belligerents
being treaties of a political nature or treaties which were the direct
cause of the war or which are incompatible with a state of hostilities.
On the other hand, those treaties remain in force which relate to the en-joyment of private rights existing before the outbreak of hostilities. In
particular treaties dealing with contracts relating to debts or pecuniary
obligations, the transfer of movable or immovable property, mortgages,
leases, and tenancy agreements, especially if they were entered into force
before the declaration of war, remain in full force. (Italics added.)
Bussi v. Menetti212 is a leading case in which the Supreme Court
of France-the Court of Cassation (Chambre sociale)-definitely quits
the abrogation doctrine. Menetti, a French national, living at Avignon
and the owner of a house of which Bussi, an Italian, was the tenant,
had given the latter notice to quit on November 4, 1938, on the ground
that, for reasons of health, he wanted to live in the house himself. In
a judgment dated December 6, 1941, the Tribunal de Paix of the
Northern Canton of Avignon had declared the notice to quit valid, on
the ground that the state of war which was declared on June 10, 1940
had terminated all treaties between France and Italy and in particular
the Treaty of Establishment of June 3, 1930. Bussi appealed; the
Court of Cassation reversed and said:
Treaties concluded between the States subsequently becoming belligerents
are not necessarily suspended by the declaration of war between the con-
tracting parties. . . In particular, treaties of a purely private law nature,
which do not involve any intercourse between the enemy Powers and
which have no connection with the conduct of hostilities, such as the
Convention relating to leases, are not, by the mere fact of war, suspended
in their effects.
Exactly the same result was reached by the Court of Cassation
(Chambre sociale) in Poet v. DeleuiP'3 some months later, allowing
PAL~AS, PROVINCIAL SUPPLE LENT 169, Nov. 1943. See also an earlier lower court decision,
Mapie v. Capelo, Tribunal civil de Caen, decided on April 9, 1941, the court holding to
the same effect, GAZrTET DU PALAis May 29, 1941.
212 Decided on November 5, 1943, REcuEm PERIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE,
Dr LEGISLAT ON BT DE DocnR= 84 (1944), with a note by Basdevant; RECUEI GENEAL
DES Lois Er DES AnRdrs I 98 (1945); GAZETTE DU PALAIS, PROVISIONAL SUPPrLEENT 168
(1943); ANNUAL DIGEST Case No. 103 (1943-1945).
213 Decision on April 21, 1944, GAZETTE DU PALAIS June 9, 1944; REUcEm GE NERAL DES
ARR9TS I 98 (1945).
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an appeal by an Italian tenant from an order of the Tribunal de Paix
of Marseilles giving possession of premises to a French landlord. This
holding was reaffirmed by the Chambre sociale of the'Court of Cassation
in four later cases dealing with the validity of the same Convention
concerning with civil and rural leases and commercial property, namely,
Hutard v. Margerit (July 25, 1946), Juidi v. Fassin (March 21, 1947),
Pinna v. Cripillon (May 20, 1947), and Amadio v. Diduant (February
13, 1948).214
The holding of the Court of Cassation in Bussi v. Menetti was
followed by a lower court, Tribunal civil de Grasse, in Rosso v. Marro.215
Rosso and his wife, Italian nationals, who had since 1938 been tenants
of certain business premises at Cannet (Alpes-Maritimes), had applied
to their landlord Marro for the renewal of their lease as from August
1, 1944. Marro refused. The Court held for Rosso, by saying that
the Court of Cassation had repudiated the doctrine which it held during
the past century, and now holds that treaties of a purely private law
nature are not suspended because of war, citing Bussi v. Menetti.
It would appear that these liberal holdings of the French courts in
this immediate post-war period are in accordance with American de-
cisions for the continued existence of treaties relating to private rights.
They are in harmony with the progressive development of international
law. According to the holdings of American courts such treaties are
not incompatible with the conduct of war, and the French courts have
adopted the same test of incompatibility as the American courts when
deciding the validity of the Franco-Italian Convention of 1930.
There are also two Tunisian cases following the same liberal pattern
and dealing with the validity of a similar treaty, viz. the Treaty of
1896 between France and Italy concerning Italian nationals in Tunis.
The Court of Tunis21 deciding as to the right of an Italian proprietor
to reassume rights of ownership over commercial property, refused to
follow the French traditional view to the effect that the Franco-Italian
Convention of 1896- was abrogated by the war, and said in its judg-
ment of February 22, 1944:
If the result of a state of war is to nullify the treaties and conventions
existing between belligerent States, it is nevertheless clear in principle
that stipulations in these treaties and conventions which do not concern
the rights and duties of States but the interests of private persons, their
214 All reported in GAzETTE DU PALAIS, passim.
215 Decided on January 18, 1945, GAZET DU PALAis February 27, 1945; SWAMi
JuRiDiQuE 2941 (1946), with a note by Benoist.
216 Reported in 2 INT. L. Q. 573 (1948).
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status, nationality, and rules relating to the acquisition of property and
to exercise of trade and commerce .. .continue to exist unless the na-
tional law contains express provisions to the contrary.Y'
It would seem that the Tunis Court was quite right in refusing to con-
sider the Convention of 1896 abrogated because of war, without a
governmental declaration to this effect. Such a declaration came a
little later. On June 22, 1944, the Provisional Government of the Re-
public in Algiers issued an Ordinance 1 in which the Franco-Italian
Treaty of 1896 was formally declared to have lapsed on the day of
the outbreak of war between France and Italy. But then the Tribunal
de Sfax of Tunis, in the case Arbib v. Procureur de la Ripublique,2 19
held that the Convention of 1896 was still applicable in regard to
Italians in Tunis as "the common law." The facts in this case were
as follows: The petitioner, one Arbib, was tried before a Court Martial
at Algiers for desertion. He attempted to prove that he was an Italian
national. The French Resident General in Tunis asked the Court of
Sfax to declare that the petitioner, born in Tunis of an Italian father,
had Italian nationality in virtue of the Treaty of 1896 between France
and Italy, which provided that Italians were not subject to the jus soli.
The Court held that the petitioner was an Italian national, and that
his enlistment in the Free French Forces could not modify his nationality.
It would seem that the Courts in Tunis considered the test of com-
patibility with the national policy as expressed in national laws as an
important and decisive factor for the continued validity of a convention
concerning private rights, and not the outbreak of war.
On February 10, 1948, without any clear reasons being given, the
liberal attitude of the French courts changed and the former view favor-
ing complete abrogation of bilateral treaties between belligerents was
re-espoused. On that date, on appeal from a decision of the Court of
Aix in the case of Artel v. Seymond, ° the Court of Cassation (Chambre
civile)2 2 held that "the existence of a state of war renders null and
217 Ibid. Italics added.
218 Referred to in a note in ANNUAL DIGEST 3 (1946).
219 Decided on December 10, 1946, 36 RENUE CRITIQI DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PIv-
427 (1947); ANNUAL DIGEST Case No. 3 (1946).
220 77 JoUNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 123 (1950); RECUEIL GEN2ERAL DES LOiS ET DES
ARREs I 49 (1949), with a note by Niboyet. For critical remarks on this case see La
Pradelle, The Effect of War on Private Law Treaties, 2 INT'L L. Q. 555 (1948); Scelle,
De l'influence de Fitat de guerre sur le Droit conventionnel (il propos d'un ricent arrit de
Cassation), 77 JoURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 26 et seq. (1950).
221 The Chambre Civile is different from the Chambre Sociale, being two divisions of
the Court of Cassation. It should here perhaps be noted that the Chambre sociale in the
case Amadio v. Diduant, decided on February 13, 1948, held exactly to the opposite.
1953]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
void all reciprocal obligations assumed by the High Contracting Parties
in a treaty concluded on matters of private law affecting relationships
in times of peace." Reasons for this sudden change of view are not
given and are difficult to understand, because exactly the same treaty
provisions and the same nationals (Italians) were involved without
any apparent change in circumstances.
In a subsequent leading case Lovera v. Rinaldi,12 the Civil Depart-
ment of the Court of Cassation sitting in Plenary Assembly (Assembl~e
pl6ni~re civile), on June 22, 1949, finally settled the conflicting views
of the French Supreme Court departments and established the old rule
of absolute abrogation as the sole legal doctrine of France. In this
case an Italian tenant on November 23, 1946, sought a renewal of his
lease of certain property in France. He claimed the benefit of the
Ordinance of October 17, 1945, regarding leases. Although this Ordi-
nance denied aliens its benefits, the Italian tenant contended that he
was entitled to them by virtue of the Convention of Establishment
of June 3, 1930 which determined he was a non-alien. The Court of
Cassation held for the defendant, saying in part:
The state of war between Italy and France was incompatible with the
maintenance of the obligations which the Convention of 1930 imposed
on France regarding the settlement of Italians in our territory; . . . the
Armistice, which had suspended hostilities, left this state of war in exist-
ence; [and] that at the date when the plaintiff brought his request the
said Convention had not been revived.
These two holdings of the French Court of Cassation have since been
followed in all cases. We could therefore conclude by saying that
the present French judicial doctrine considers the effect of war as
ipso facto abrogating all treaties, even those containing private rights.
This trend is to be regretted, because it seems to be "ill founded in law
and contrary to the evolutionary trend of international law".
3) Holland. Generally the Dutch decisions hold that war suspends
multilateral conventions as between belligerent States but leaves them
in full force between nonbelligerents. I have not been able to discover
222 77 JouRAL DU DROIT INTERNATIoNAL 125 et seq. (1950); REcuaI. GENERAL DES Lois
ET DES ARRETS 49 (1949), and 161 (1950), with a note by Niboyet defending the decision.
Scelle, supra note 220, at 26 says that this case is not in conformity with the French
Constitution.
23 See, e.g., Andreoli v. Clement, November 10, 1949; De Dal Agnol v. B~gue, November
10, 1949; Boufferon v. Pelotto, December 9, 1949; and the cases Lancini v. Villeneuve;
Carotti v. Manzon; Frare v. Cabalie; and Grouchi v. Berroyer, all decided on December 17,
1949; see 77 JOuIRNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 129 (1950).
224 Scelle, supra note 220, at 29.
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any Dutch case with regard to the effect of war on a bilateral treaty.
It seems however, that the Dutch Courts would follow the practice of
French courts and favor abrogation. In the Hecht case,'2Z decided
by the Supreme Court of Holland on April 3, 1941, the petitioner Eugen
Hecht, a German national, invoked the Hague Convention on Civil
Procedure of July 17, 1905, to which both Germany and Holland were
parties. Hecht sought leave to sue as a poor person, but according to
the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure2 6 a foreigner may sue as a poor
person only by virtue of an express treaty provision to this effect. On
appeal the Court dismissed the case. It said:
It is true that the Netherlands and the German Reich are both parties
to the Convention on Civil Procedure, Article 20 of which provides for
the admission of the subjects of each of the contracting parties to the
privilege of poor persons' procedure in the Courts of any other of those
parties on an equal footing with nationals. However, as a consequence
of the outbreak of war between the Netherlands and Germany, the said
Convention has ceased to operate between them.
However, it must be remembered that Holland was still occupied by
Germany at this time and the Dutch courts were not willing to extend
the privileges of this Convention to enemy nationals. Nor is it quite
clear whether the Court held for abrogation or only suspension of this
Convention.
In the case In re Anna K.227 the same Hague Convention on Civil
Procedure was involved. In this case a German woman had married a
Dutch citizen on June 12, 1940, thus acquiring Dutch nationality. Under
an Emergency Decree of November 17, 1945 -S2 she lost her Dutch nation-
ality and consequently became an enemy alien. In 1946 she applied for
free legal aid to obtain a divorce. The District Court of Rotterdam on
June 15, 1946, held that the application could not be granted, because
owing to the state of war still subsisting between Holland and Germany,
the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure, the basis on which such an ap-
plication could be granted, must be considered to be suspended as between
the two countries.
The same multilateral convention on Civil Procedure, as between
Holland and Luxemburg, was under consideration in the case Huby
Frres of Echternach v. Rack6Y2 The plaintiff, a national of Luxem-
225 NEiELAmoSCm JUrISPRUDENCE No. 23 (1942) ; ANNUAL, DIGEST Case No. 133 (Supp.
Vol. 1919-1942).
226 Article 885, ff 2.
227 NEDERLANDSCHE JuRISPRuDENnE No. 695 (1946).
228 OsncAz jouasiAL No. F.278 (1945).
229 NEDERLANDSCHE JuRISPRUDENTIE No. 148 (1942); ANN A DIGEST Case No. 123
(Supp. Vol. 1919-1942).
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burg, instituted proceedings against a Dutch national, who demanded
that the plaintiff furnish security for costs. The latter objected and
invoked the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure. At the time when
the action was brought Luxemburg was occupied by Germany, who
had announced the annexation of Luxemburg. The defendant relied
on this fact and maintained that the Convention was no longer applicable.
The Cantonal Court of Utrecht, on September 8, 1941, held for the
plaintiffs. The Court said that since the Convention has not been de-
nounced by either of the contracting parties, the fact that Luxemburg
had been annexed by Germany did not change the rights and obliga-
tions resulting from the Convention for nationals of the two States,
and therefore the nationals of Luxemburg still enjoyed in Holland
the privileges conferred on them by the Convention and are free from
giving any security for costs. This case should be compared with the
prior Hecht case ° where exactly the same treaty benefits were with-
held from the occupying Germans. Of course, it is also true that
Luxemburg and Holland had not been at war, while Germany and
Holland had. It was, nevertheless, a courageous stand to take during
the occupation, especially since Germany had declared Luxemburg
annexed.
In the case .Atablissements Strauss v. Vraets Bros. a' the District
Court of Utrecht held that the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure
of 1905 was in force in relations between Holland and France and had
not lost its validity because of war and the occupation of both countries.
The Court said:
It is not known to the Court that the Convention has been denounced
either by France or by the Netherlands. There is no reason for the sup-
position that the Convention has lost its validity as between France and
the Netherlands in the prevailing circumstances in virtue of any un-
written rule of international law. There exists no state of war between the
two countries.
With the last submission the Court seems to indicate its sympathy for
the doctrine that war ipso facto abrogates treaties as between belliger-
ents, but upholds the validity of the treaty as between friendly nations.
The validity of another Hague Convention, the Convention *of 1902
concerning Marriage,23 2 was discussed in Gehrmann and Maatje van
der Have v. Registrar.? The Registrar had refused to marry the
230 See p. 529 supra.
231 Decided on May 20, 1942, NEDERLANDSCE JuRiSPRuDENTIE No. 796 (1942); ANNuAL
DIGEST Case No. 119 (Supp. Vol. 1919-1942).
232 31 MARTExs, N.R.G. 2nd ser., 706 (1906).
233 Decided on February 5, 1947, by the District Court of Middelburg, NED=AiwSCHE
JuRiSPRuDENTrE No. 26 (1948); ANNuAL DIGEST Case No. 83 (1947).
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claimants on the ground that an Ekefdhigkeitszeugnis, a certificate
from the Berlin Standesamt, was required by the bridegroom and had
not been supplied. A certificate of that character was required by
virtue of the Hague Convention concerning Marriage. The claimants
asked the Court to declare that they could be married. The District
Court of Middelburg held that the claimants could be legally married,
because the war between Holland and Germany had suspended the
operation of the said Convention, and the authorities of the Netherlands
were not bound by any treaty provisions in judging whether the bride-
groom had fulfilled the requirements of national law for his marriage.
In this case, the court said, those requirements were fulfilled.
In a later case, 3 4 decided in 1948, the Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands held the Hague Conventions regarding Marriage and Divorce
valid and dpplicable in relations between Holland and Germany though
the two countries were still legally in war. The Supreme Court of the
Netherlands is the highest Dutch authority in matters of treaty inter-
pretations235 Therefore, it is hoped that its latest decision, indicating
a more liberal construction of the effect of war on treaties, will be an
authority for later decisions upholding the validity of other treaties
concerning private rights. Although there is no express indication
in the cases dealing with the validity of treaties between Holland and
Germany whether the court gives any decisive importance to the acts
of the political department of the Dutch Government, one is led to
infer this from the cases dealing with the validity of Dutch treaties
with Luxemburg and France.
4) Germany. As in the case of French decisions, German decisions
concerning the effect of war on treaties are not remarkable for their
consistency. During World War I the courts were split in their de-
cisions236 and this split seems to be continuing at present. There have
234 Decision on April 2, 1948, NEDEan.ANVsca JuRISPRUDENTiE No. 442 (1948).
235 Grund, Prozessfilhrung und Urteilsvollstreckung irn Ausland, 4 NEuB JuzusnscH
WocHENscHRir 823, 825 (1951).
236 Upholding the validity of treaties see German Patentamt, October 26, 1914, 44
JuisTiscHnE WocHmscHRr (hereinafter JW) 145 (1915) ; Reichsgericht, October 26, 1914,
1. Zivilsenat, ENTSCHLEMUNGEN DES REiCHSGEIcTicS IN ZVLACEmN (hereinafter RGZ) 85,
375; Oberlandesgericht (hereinafter OLG) Hamburg, July 14, 1917, DEuTscnE J IsTEN-
ZEiTuNG 907 (1917) ; Landgericht (hereinafter LG) Berlin, November 6, 1914, MAUCENscHUTZ
uN WETTrEWERB 156 (1915) ; LG Leipzig, March 20, 1915, 44 JW 418 (1915) ; LG Leipzig,
May 29, 1915, 44 JW 732 (1915) ; OLG K6nigsberg, August 23, 1916, 21 DJZ 1003 (1916) ;
OLG Harem, May 12, 1915, 44 JW 802 (1915). Contra: Kammergericht, January 28, 1915,
44 JW 802 (1915); OLG Dresden, October 2, 1917, SXcHszscHns Ascmav OR REcHTsPFIWE
149 (1918) ; LG K61n, October 16, 1914, 44 JW 110 (1915) ; OLG Hamburg, June 11, 1915,
KOSTERSBELLEMENS, LES CONVENTIONS DE LA HAVE DE "1902 59 1905 suR E. DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PaxV- 1173 (1921); Kammergericht, February 26, 1915, 20 DJZ 616 (1915).
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been no leading German cases on the effect of war on treaties since
the second World War. Multilateral treaties have been applied by
German courts without, however, any discussion of the effect of war.
In S. P. v. M.3 7 an action was brought in 1942 in Germany by a
Dutch citizen claiming exclusive use of an internationally registered
trade mark under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property of 1883. s The German Reicksgericht upheld his exclusive
rights under the Convention, thus impliedly recognizing the continued
validity of the Convention as between Holland and Germany in spite
of war.
The exclusive use of an international trade mark was again upheld
by the German Reichsgericht in Naamlooze Vennootschap C. A. W. E.
Zeepfabriek "De vergulde Hand" v. D. - Werke M. & W.1 9 The
Court applied the above mentioned Paris Convention of 1883 and
the Madrid Agreement concerning Arrangements in regard to Indica-
tions of Origin and the Registration of Trade Marks of 1891, 40 once
more tacitly assuming the continued validity of the agreements.
Decisions in respect to multilateral treaties where the parties are
not belligerents have been consistent, however. In this situation, the
validity of the treaty has been upheld despite the outbreak of war
between the other parties to the treaty, as illustrated in a recent Ober-
landesgerickt Frankfurt a. M. decision.241 Here the Hague Convention
on Civil Procedure of 19051 as between the German and Swiss parties
was involved and upheld.
The general view of German courts seems to be that bilateral treaties,
even those concerning private rights, are abrogated by war."4 A
recent unreported decision of Oberlandesgericht of Muniche" followed
this rule. In it, the Convention concerning the Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1937"4
237 Decided on June 29, 1942, by the Second Civil Senate of the Reichsgericht, 169 RGZ
240 (1942).
238 8 MARTENS, N.R.G. 3rd ser., 760 (1917); 74 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIEs 289;
3 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1761 (1931).
239 170 RGZ 302 (1943), decided on January 28, 1943, by the Second Civil Senate of the
Reichsgericht.
240 22 MARTENs, N.R.G. 2nd ser., 208 (1895).
21 Decided on March 27, 1950, reported in 4 NEuE Jutisniscn- WocHENscER 38
(1951).
242 2 MARTENS, N.R.G. 3rd ser., 243 (1910).
23 See 4 NEUE JuRIsniscB WOcHENsca 831 (1951).
244 OLG Miinchen, decision of July 9, 1952, mentioned in 7 JTRISTENZEITUNG 682, 683
(1952).
245 RGB1. II, 145 (1937); GAzETTA UFmCiALE, No. 44, February 22, 1937.
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between Germany and Italy was held not to have been in force since
1943 when Germany and Italy had been at war. But the situation
with respect to bilateral treaties is extremely confused. German text-
writers 46 have maintained that all bilateral treaties between belligerents
are abrogated. The present view of the German Government, how-
ever, as we have seen,241 is that treaties concerning private rights
are not abrogated.
Peace Treaties of World War II
It has become customary to insert provisions in peace treaties con-
cerning the validity of pre-war treaties between the former enemies
in order to provide certainty as to whether they are to continue in
force or not after the war has ended. There are, however, a few
recent exceptions to this customary rule. For instance, the Peace Treaty
of Moscow of March 13, 1940, between Finland and Soviet Russia,
does not contain any provisions concerning treaties. Neither does the
Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal
Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, a "provisional"
peace treaty popularly called the "Peace Contract", contain any refer-
ences to treaties, although probably for the reason that this has been re-
served for the final peace treaty. 8 All other peace treaties of World
War II, however, contain references to treaties.
1) Multilateral Treaties. In the Peace Treaties ending the first
World War elaborate provisions with regard to multilateral treaties
were included,249 but in the Peace Treaties of 1947 with Italy," ° Ru-
246 RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZrvILROZESSRECHT 24 et seq. (1949); BAUXBrACHr-LAuTER-
BACH, ZIVLPROZESSORDNUNG (1950), Einleitung IV, p. 23.
247 See p. 352 supra.
248 There exists a German Peace Treaty proposal concerning Industrial Property,
adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce at its XIth Congress at Montreux
in June 1947, but this proposal is unsatisfactory as far as the prewar treaties are
concerned, because it follows the terms of the Treaty of Versailles (Article 286), which
was renounced at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946. See DRAFT PROVISIoNs RELATING
TO PATENTS, DESIGNS, TRADE MARIUS, COPYRIGHT AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
International Chamber of Commerce, Brochure No. 118 (1947). At present United
States and German experts are re-examining eighteen to twenty pre-World War II bilateral
treaties and between forty and fifty multilateral treaties involving the two countries
with a view to determining those that should be reactivated, amended, or discarded.
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1953, p. 1, col. 5. When this work has been completed relations
between the United States and West Germany will be regulated by a network of legal
agreements, regardless of the fate of the Bonn "Peace Contract" or the final peace treaty.
249 See e.g. Article 282 et seq. of the Treaty of Versailles; Article 217 et seq, of the
Treaty of Trianon, Article 269 et seq. of the Treaty of Sevres, Article 167 et seq. of the
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mania,251 Bulgaria,252 Hungary, 2 3 and Finland,254 and with Japan of
1951.11 Only bilateral treaties are dealt with, nothing being mentioned
about multilateral treaties, which were thus put on a different basis. This
procedure was mainly due to the great number of multilateral treaties
in existence, to which the former enemies, who did not participate
in the peace conference of 1946, were parties together with the neutral
powers, and to the difficulty which would have arisen in trying to
include detailed provisions about all these treaties. Therefore it was
decided to say nothing about them in the Peace Treaties, leaving the
matter to rest on the basic rules of international law governing them.25 6
This is the principal difference between the Peace Treaties of the
two World Wars. At the Paris Conference of 1946 the view was taken
that multilateral treaties, and particularly those of a technical and
non-political character, were in principle not affected by the outbreak
of war as far as their existence and continued validity was concerned.
They were at most suspended in their operation for the period of the
hostilities, and upon the restoration of peace they automatically revived
without the necessity of any special provision to that effect 57 This is
Treaty of Neuilly, and Article 234 et seq. of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. See also
comments on the Treaty of Versailles: THE TREATY OF VERSAILLEs AND AFTER. ANNOTATION
oF THE TEXT OF THE TREATY, DE'T OF STATE PUB. 2724, pp. 565-580 (1947).
250 61 STAT. 1386 (1948).
251 61 STAT. 1803 (1948).
252 61 STAT. 1956 (1948).
253 61 STAT. 2115 (1948)..
254 DEP'T OF STATE PUB. 2743, European Series 21 (1947). The Finnish Peace Treaty
is not signed by the United States, because there was no war with Finland.
255 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. SERVICE, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 2730 (1951); see also
CONFERENCE FOR TIE CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN,
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, DEPIT OF STATE PUB. 4392 (1951). The Treaty of Peace with
Japan was ratified by the United States on April 15, 1952, and entered into force on
April 28, 1952, at 9:30 a.m., eastern daylight saving time, according to the provisions
of Article 23 of the Peace Treaty. See 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 658 and 687 (1952).
255 Fitzmaurice, The Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties, 73 RCADI 259-308
(1948-I). See also MAKING THE PEACE TREATIES, DEP'T OF STATE PuB. 2774, European
Series 24 (1941-1947); COMMENTARY ON T TREATIES OF PEACE WiTH ITALY, Ruasssm,
BUrAIA, HUNGARY, AND FnLAND, Misc. No. 2 (1947), Cmd. 7026; TREATES oF PEACE
WITH ITALY, RmrANIA, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY, Hearings before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. SENATE, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., EXECUTIvES F, G, H, and I.
257 See 3 DOCUMENTS OF TH1E PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE (C.P.) J.R., 6th Meeting, 348
(1947), which contain the proceedings of the Legal and Drafting Commission, which
drew up the Peace Treaties of 1947, saying, in part, as follows: "The question of multi-
lateral treaties was discussed when the text of Article 37 was drawn up. The authors
of the draft of this Article . . . agreed that, according to the opinion at present prevail-
ing in international law, the communis opinia, multilateral treaties are only suspended
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a most satisfactory development and it is gratifying to note that modern
principles regarding multilateral pre-war treaties have been adopted
and applied in respect to the Peace Treaties of 1947 and 1951 (with
Japan).
Perhaps one more remark is necessary in regard to the Declaration
referring to multilateral treaties, made unilaterally by Japan in signing
the Peace Treaty. The declaration2 8 is as follows:
1. Except as otherwise provided in the said Treaty of Peace, Japan
recognizes the full force of all presently effective multilateral international
instruments to which Japan was a party on September 1, 1939, and de-
dares that it will, on the first coming into force of the said Treaty, resume
all its rights and obligations under those instruments. Where, however,
participation in any instrument involves membership in an international
organization of which Japan ceased to be a member on or after September
1, 1939, the provisions of the present paragraph shall be dependent on
Japan's readmission to membership in the organization concerned.
2. It is the intention of the Japanese Government formally to accede
to the following international instruments within the shortest practicable
time, not to exceed one year from the first coming into force of the Treaty
of Peace: .. . [Thereafter follows an enumeration of various multilateral
treaties, altogether nine in number].
In view of the practice adopted and followed at the Peace Conference
of Paris of 1946 it is doubtful whether the present Declaration of
the Japanese Government was at all necessary from the legal point of
view. According to the modern legal view, Japan would without such
a declaration, have been bound after the cessation of hostilities by all
Multilateral Treaties to which she was a party before the outbreak
of the war. Therefore this Declaration seems to have only a declaratory
value, not changing legally the principles adopted at the Paris Peace
Conference of 1946.
2) Bilateral Treaties. The Peace Treaties of 1947 with Italy, Ru-
mania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland all contain mutatis mutandis,
a similar provision" concerning prewar bilateral treaties and there-
fore it might be appropriate to cite, as representative of them all,
Article 44 of the Treaty with Italy which reads as follows:
1. Each Allied or Associated Power will notify Italy, within a period
by war. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with the re-establishment of such Treaties
in the Peace Treaty".
258 U.S. CODE CONG. A&D Anmaci. SFRvcF 2742 et seq. (1951). For a critical comment
on this Declaration see Brandon and Leriche, Suspension of Rights and Obligations under
Multilateral Conventions Between Opposing Belligerents on Account of War, 46 Ax. J.
INT'L L. 532 (1952).
259 Article 8 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, Article 10 (Hungary), Article 10
(Rumania), and Article 12 (Finland).
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of six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which
of its pre-war bilateral treaties with Italy it desires to keep in force or
revive. Any provisions not in conformity with the present Treaty shall,
however, be deleted from the above mentioned treaties.
2. All such treaties so notified shall be registered with the Secretariat
of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
3. All suck treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.
Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1951 follows the same
idea expressed in Article 44, differing, however, in wording:
(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty
has come Into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its
prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue
in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall con-
tinue in force or be revived subject only to such amendments as may be
necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and
conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in
force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be
registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All suck treaties
and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded
as abrogated.
(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may
except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any territory
for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible,
until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that
such exception shall cease to apply.
From the wording of these articles it seems apparent that the draft-
ers had in mind the absolute abrogation doctrine with regard to prewar
bilateral treaties with former enemy countries. It seems less clear,
however, what the legal basis of abrogation is in this case. Is it war?
Or is it the peace treaty itself? The wording and especially those
parts italicized speak strongly for the latter. Only those bilateral
treaties with the former enemy will continue in force or revive, which
the victorious power wishes, and of which it notifies its defeated op-
ponent. All other treaties which it does not wish to continue, and with
respect to which it makes no notification, shall be abrogated. Applying
in this way the absolute abrogation doctrine the drafters of the Peace
Treaties of 1947 and 1951 have reserved completely free hands to their
respective governments to denounce all their prewar treaty obligations.
They are entirely free to keep in force or maintain only those bilateral
treaties which are favorable to them, and those less favorable and
containing onerous obligations, they have full right not to notify."'0
260 On February 6, 1948, the Government of the United States notified the Italian
Government, in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of the Peace Treaty, of the
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This procedure has already been singled out by Judge Cardozo, who
dealing with the German and Austrian Peace Treaties of the First
World War, noted in Techt v. Hughes26' that these treaties "give the
victorious powers the privilege of choosing the treaties which are to be
kept in force or abrogated". This applies equally to the above cited
articles of the Peace Treaties of 1947 and 1951.
There is some further evidence for the view that it is not war but
the treaty of peace which is the real basis of the abrogation. Article
289 of the Treaty of Versailles confers the right to abrogate bilateral
treaties on some Allied and Associated Powers 62 even if they had not
been at war with Germany but merely had broken off diplomatic rela-
tions.2 3 Although this provision has been left out of the peace treaties
of World War II dealing with the validation of the pre-war treaties gen-
erally, it has been inserted into other Articles of these treaties dealing
with economic relations.264
following pre-war bilateral treaties which it desired to keep in force or revive, namely,
treaties concerning arbitration (1928), air navigation (1931), advancement of peace
(1914), consular matters (1878), debt-funding (1925), extradition (1868), the traffic
in narcotic drugs (1928), the reciprocal recognition of certificates of inspection of
vessels (1931), passport visa fees (1929), postal communications (1877 and 1929), relief
from double income tax on shipping profits (1926), and reciprocal protection of trade
marks (1882). The Bulgarian Government was notified as to eleven, the Hungarian
Government twelve, and Rumanian Government thirteen prewar bilateral conventions of
similar kind. See for details 5 UNIrTE STATEs TREATY DEvELoxmmNTs, APENDx III
(A) (1950). On April 22, 1953, the Department of State notified the Japanese Govern-
ment, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, of
the following treaties, which the United States Government desires to keep in force or
revive: extradition (1886 and 1906), narcotic drugs (1928 and 1929), postal (1885, 1888,
1889, 1904 and 1938), property-leaseholds (1937), smuggling of intoxicating liquors
(1930), and reciprocal exemption from taxation (1926). These treaties shall be con-
sidered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the official
notification, i.e. July 22, 1953. See DEP'T OF STATE PREsS RELEASE No. 211, April 24,
1953, 28 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 721 (1953), No. 725.
For a list of treaties from the United Kingdom Government notifying the Governments
of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Rumania and Hungary, see 2 INT'L L.Q. 535-538 (1948).
This list covers, e.g., concerning Italy, the following pre-existing treaties: extradition
(1873), estates of deceased seamen (1877), relief of distressed seamen (1880), parcel
post (concerning Malta, 1896), coastal trade (1904), war graves (1922), money orders
(1925), parcel post (1930), mutual recognition of passenger ship certificates and emigrant
ship regulations (1929), legal proceedings in civil and commercial matters (1930), reciprocal
validation of certificates of airworthiness (1934), diplomatic bags (1938), and trade
in medicinal products (1940).
261 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, 197 (1920).
262 E.g., Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Uruguay.
263 See the comments on the Treaty of Versailles, TREATY oF VERs AsES AND APTER.
ANNOTATIOx OF =HE TEXT OF T=E TREATY, DEmt. OF STATE PUB. 2724, pp. 575 et seq. (1947).
264 E.g., Article 84 of the Italian Peace Treaty, which is giving the benefit of certain
economic articles of the Peace Treaty to the countries who had merely broken off their
diplomatic relations with Italy.
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It is believed that bilateral treaties between belligerents, if they do
not provide expressly to the -contrary, in the same manner as the multi-
lateral treaties, continue in existence during the whole period of war
until the re-establishment of peace. Their operation automatically
continues or revives if the victorious powers do not abrogate them by
the provisions of peace treaties. The continued existence of bilateral
treaties during the war has considerable practical importance in connec-
tion with claims and rights of individuals arising under these treaties,
as we have seen from the discussion of the judicial decisions in the
preceding section.
It is therefore submitted that the terminating factor of bilateral
treaties in the second World War has not been the war, but the will
or intention of the victorious powers as expressed in the peace treaties.
In other words, bilateral treaties between the belligerents were termi-
nated ex nunc, i.e., from the time of conclusion of the peace treaty, and
not ex tunc, i.e., from the time of the outbreak of the war, and it
has no retroactive effect. The parties of course could have provided
for retroactivity, but this again would be a manifestation of intention
and not a result of war.
CONCLUSION
The fact that modern war is increasingly cruel is no justification for
wholly abandoning the legal basis of international society and the
respect for human rights in time of war. The view which claims that
war renders all treaties, even those concerning private rights, invalid,
is in the sharpest conflict with the idea of stability, necessary for any
legal order. It is true that suspension of treaties for the duration of
war may be necessitated by legitimate requirements of national defense,
but it does not require the annihilation of the whole system of treaty
obligations. War may even lead to such fundamental .changes in con-
ditions as to warrant the invoking of rebus sic stantibus as to a par-
ticular treaty or treaties. But war in itself has no inherent power to
abrogate a treaty automatically.
The question whether a treaty remains in force or not and whether
it is applicable in time of war should be decided according to the
intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, as
expressed in the treaty itself, or, if not expressed, implied therefrom
by a liberal construction. The intention at the time of conclusion and
not the present intention should be controlling. The treaty remains in
force until terminated in accordance with its own terms, or, if the
provisions for that purpose are lacking, in accordance with the prin-
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ciples of international law. International law allows no unilateral and
deliberate denunciations without legal grounds.
Treaties create a legal order between States and the principal requisite
for the existence of this order is stability. Wishing to protect the in-
terests of their nationals, States have generally left treaties of private
law character in force also in time of war. Where, however, peace
treaties establish a new order, prewar treaties will be adapted and
brought into conformity with the new order. This has been expressly
provided for in all peace treaties.
New principles have become manifest in the Peace Treaties of
World War II in the treatment of prewar multilateral treaties, which
have been considered as still in force and therefore no specific stipula-
tion concerning the validity of multilateral treaties has been inserted
into these Peace Treaties. Bilateral prewar treaties on the other
hand have been treated as abrogated in the absence of a specific notifica-
tion-just as in the Peace Treaties of World War I. The legal basis
of the abrogation of these treaties seems to be not war but the intention
of the victorious parties expressed in the peace treaties. Whatever may
be the weight of the political reasons which have prompted this policy,
it is believed that such an en bloc unilateral revision by the victorious
powers contains the germs for a later unilateral counter-revision on the
opposite side, as has happened in the case of the Treaty of Versailles
in the recent history and which ultimately led right into World War II.
The decisions of the United States courts are in accord with the
progressive view upholding the validity of treaties in time of war,
and only treaties incompatible with national policy are treated as sus-
pended or abrogated. It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the
general American rule is the same liberal rule as enunciated by Justice
Washington over one hundred and thirty years ago-that war does not
automatically terminate treaties, especially those governing private
rights; it means, in other words, a complete rejectment of the "modern"
doctrine of the "total" abrogative effect of modern wars on treaty
relations.ISince the United States courts generally do not assume an active
role and consult the political department of the government as to its
views on compatibility with national policy, it is therefore extremely
important for counsel to obtain information concerning this view and
bring it before the court.
There seems to be a lack of uniform principles of international
law governing the validity of treaties in time of war. This is partly
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due to a certain unwillingness of States to insert express provisions
in the treaties concerning this point, and there will probably be no gen-
eral progress in this problem until a greater sense of security is reached
between States than there exists today. 'States should then be willing
to present their differences of opinion in matters of construction, re-
vision, suspension, or termination of their treaties to an outside au-
thority, as e.g., the International Court of Justice, for an objective
judgment. In any case there should be no retrogression to the old abro-
gation doctrine.
